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Caldwell: Civil Procedure: Discover in Eminent Domain Proceedings as Applie

CASE COMMENTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE: DISCOVERY IN EMINENT DOMAIN
PROCEEDINGS AS APPLIED TO THE OPINIONS,
CONCLUSIONS AND REPORTS OF
EXPERT APPRAISERS*
Carlson v. Pinellas County, 227 So. 2d 703 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969)
During the course of eminent domain proceedings brought by Pinellas
County, the county attempted to take the deposition' of an appraiser previously consulted by appellant landowner's counsel. The trial court, overruling appellant's objection, - allowed discovery of the appraiser's opinions
and conclusions as to the fair market value of the property in question
and subsequently permitted the county to call the appraiser as a witness,
again over objection. 3 The landowners appealed, claiming that the information sought came under the protection of the "work product" rule and should
have been immune from discovery. The Second District Court of Appeal,
reversing, HELD, that information resulting from the work of the appraiser
retained by a private landowner condemnee was immune from discovery
by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. 4
Work product discovery is an area permeated with confusion and uncertainty, the boundaries of which are "at best nebulous and at worst nonexistent." 5 Even where the rules of procedure are uniform, 6 as within the
federal court system, neither the rules themselves' nor the cases arising under
the rules provide clear guidelines for determining what information is or is
not immune from discovery.8 The Supreme Court 9 has announced that the
test of whether to allow discovery of work product material is whether the
moving party has shown "sufficient cause." This test, however, has been less
than helpful. While its use indicates that something more than ordinary
good cause must be shown in such a case, 10 the difficulty of determining what
constitutes "sufficient cause" has given rise to more litigation and comment
than any other single area of the rules of civil procedure."
*EDITOR's NOTE: This case comment received the George W. Milam Award as the outstanding case comment submitted by a junior candidate in the fall 1969 quarter.
1. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.410 (b).
2. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.310(b).
3. 227 So. 2d 703 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
4. Id. at 706.
5. Note, Discovery of Experts: A Historical Problem and a Proposed FRCP Solution,
53 MINN. L. REv. 785, 793 (1969).
6. Cf. Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 180, 189, 373 P.2d
439, 444 (1962).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
8. LaFrance, Work Product Discovery: A Critique, 68 DICK. L. REV. 351, 371-79 (1964).
9. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
10. Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, 53 MINN. L. REv. 1269, 1273 (1969).
11. Note, Discovery - The Work Product Protection, 13 U. KAN. L. REv. 125 (1964).
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The instant case concerns the application of discovery rules to expert
appraisers' opinions and conclusions in land condemnation proceedings. Because there are no Florida cases on point,'12 the court relied on Shell v. State
Road Department,13 in which the condemnee landowner sought discovery of
worksheets prepared by state appraisers. The Florida supreme court stated
that in an ordinary case such information would be immune from discovery,
but held that work product immunity did not extend to the type of information sought in condemnation proceedings. 14 The court in Shell based its
departure from ordinary discovery concepts on the relative position of the
parties in an eminent domain action, finding that a branch of the state
government could have "no justification for . . being secretive to the possible detriment of a landowner whose property is being taken against his
will.""5
Since the Florida rules governing discovery are substantially the same
as the federal rules,'16 the opinions of the federal courts are highly persuasive
in this area.' 7 Although the decisions are far from unanimous, s a clear
majority of courts tends to restrict discovery of opinions and conclusions of
expert appraisers in land condemnation actions. 9 Within this framework
the federal cases fall into three groups: 20 the first holding that in condemnation actions parties are not entitled to any information concerning the
use of appraisers by the opposing party.2' The rationale generally used in
these cases is that since condemnation actions present only the issue of
determining "just compensation," the function of discovery in narrowing the
issues before trial does not exist,22 and the landowner can advance the
necessary proof of his contention without discovery. This rationale appears to
be based on the assumption that the condemnee has ample means of pre23
senting his claim as to what constitutes "just compensation" for his land.
However, this is frequently not the case, and in these situations the denial
of discovery against government appraisers may limit the landowner's
opportunity to refute effectively the appraisers' evaluation.24
12. 227 So. 2d 703, 705 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
13. 135 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1961).
14. Id. at 860.
15. Id. at 861.
16. E.g., compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26, with FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280.
17. Savage v. Rowell Distrib. Corp., 95 So. 2d 415, 417 (Fla. 1957); Delta Rent-A-Car v.
Rihl, 218 So. 2d 467, 468 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
18. For example, a single expert's report has been found to be discoverable in one
district court and not in another-where the same litigation was conducted in two districts.
Compare Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio
1947), afl'd sub nom. Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948), with
Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947).
19. Note, Discovery of Expert Opinions and Conclusions in Condemnation Proceedings
in Federal and California Courts, 20 HASTNGS L.J. 650, 656 (1969).
20. Id. at 653.
21. E.g., United States v. 6.82 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 195 (D.N.M. 1955); Hickey v.
United States, 18 F.R.D. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
22. United States v. 7,534.04 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 146 (N.D. Ga. 1954).
23. United States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, 30 F.R.D. 512, 521 (W.D. Ark. 1962).
24. Note, Pre-trialDiscovery in Condemnation Proceedings: An Evaluation, 42 ST. JOHN'S
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The second group of federal cases allows discovery of facts upon which
appraisal reports are based, but not the reports themselves or the opinions
of the appraisers contained therein.25 Courts in this group appear to follow
a general rule of nondiscoverability of opinionative material, 2 applying this
rule with especial strictness in condemnation actions.27 These courts either
deny discovery of the reports or opinions absolutely -s or deny disclosure
in the absence of special circumstances, 9 such as the uniqueness of the material3° or the unavailability elsewhere of the information sought.3 1 Some
courts in this group include comparable sales data in the category of discoverable facts, 3- characterizing such data as the best means of ascertaining the fair

33
market value of the property being condemned.
Taking a more liberal view of the rules, the third group of cases tends
to allow discovery of the opinions and conclusions of the government's
expert appraiser by deposition3 4 and, in at least one case, by disclosure of
the government's appraisal report itself. 35 Courts in this group generally see
little value in making a distinction between expert witnesses and lay witnesses for purposes of discovery. 6 The recent case of United States v. Meyer,3 7
which applies a concept of full discovery in a condemnation action, may be
indicative of a trend in the federal court system toward a more liberal interpretation of discovery rules in such actions.38
This problem has been dealt with less frequently in state jurisdictions.
Several states 39 have explicitly placed the opinions or conclusions of experts
beyond discovery in all cases.40 On the other hand, Maryland provides no

L. REV.
25.
26.
27.
28.

52, 57 (1967).
E.g., United States v. 19.987 Acres of Land, 27 F.R.D. 420 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
Note, supra note 19, at 654.
See United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D. 192, 193 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
United States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75, 77-78 (E.D.N.Y.

1962).

29.

United States v. 4.724 Acres of Land, 31 F.R.D. 290, 292 (E.D. La. 1962).

30.

Brown v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 17 F.R.D. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).

31. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D. 192, 193 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
32. E.g., United States v. 3595.98 Acres of Land, 212 F. Supp. 617, 618-19 (N.D. Cal.
1962).

33. United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land, 200 F.2d 659, 662 (4th Cir. 1952). In United
States v. 3595.98 Acres of Land, 212 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1962), the court went so far
as to require the exchange of lists of comparable sales data between the parties prior to
trial.
34. E.g., United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. 23.76
Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963).
35. United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
36. See United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).
37. 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).
38. See Note, supra note 19, at 672-73.
39. E.g., IDAHO R. CIv. P. 26(b); IOWA R. Civ. P. 141; LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1452 (West
1960); Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.01; NEV. R. Civ. P. 186a; N.J. R. Civ. P. 26(b); PA. R. CIV. P 4011;
Tax. R. Civ. P. 186 (a); UTAH R. CIv. P. 30(b); WASH. R. PLEADING, PRAC. & PROC. 26(b);
W. VA. R. CIv. P. 30 (b).
40. Goldstein, The Discovery Process in Highway Land Acquisition, 14 AM. U. L. REv.
38, 54 (1964).
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protection for experts against discovery.41 The Arizona supreme court 42 has
ruled that the opinions and conclusions of an appraiser consulted by condemnees was not "work product" and was discoverable4" by the government
as a matter of right.44 Making no distinction between the respective positions
of the state and the private landowner in a condemnation case as opposed to
an ordinary suit, the Arizona court applied the same liberal discovery concept as would have been used in ordinary litigation. Iowa45 and Wisconsin"
have allowed discovery of opinions and conclusions of government appraisers
on motion by private landowners. Conversely, the Illinois rule is that the
work of state appraisers is privileged.47
One or more of five rationales are generally used in justifying the denial
of discovery in condemnation cases. Hickman v. Taylor~s provided one justification by holding that a lawyer, in his role as an advocate and an officer
of the court, demands a certain degree of privacy in performing his duties
and that requiring production of the lawyer's work product would lead to
inefficiency and curtailment of trial preparation. 49 Discovery procedures,
however, are unlikely to cause any attorney to forego necessary trial preparation, because an attorney must be completely familiar with the facts in order
to evaluate the case realistically and advise his client accordingly.50 In view
of the vital nature of the evidence given by expert appraisers and the often
highly technical nature of the material presented, the Hickman rationale for
denying discovery of work product material is particularly not persuasive
when applied to condemnation cases. 5 ' In any case, the sufficient cause requirement of Hickman5 2 for allowing discovery would seem to be satisfied
by the nature of the condemnation action itself and the central part appraisers' opinions play in the proceedings, 53 at least when the landowner is
5
the party seeking discovery. 4
The second reason usually advanced for denying discovery in eminent
domain proceedings is that information such as appraisers' reports falls
within the attorney-client privilege and is thus immune from discovery. 55
41. MD. R. Civ. P. 410.
42. State ex rel. Willey v. Whitman, 91 Ariz. 120, 370 P.2d 273 (1962).
43. A contrary ruling by the lower court, however, was held to be nonprejudicial and
the decision was affirmed, 91 Ariz. 120, 125, 370 P.2d 273, 277 (1962).
44. Arizona's discovery rules are identical with the federal rules and thus, are substantially the same as the Florida rules. See Comment, 111 U. PA. L. Rv. 509, 510 (1963).
45. Crist v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 255 Iowa 615, 123 N.W.2d 424 (1963).
46. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Circuit Court, 15 Wis. 2d 311, 112 N.W.2d 686 (1961).
47. City of Chicago v. Harrison- Halsted Bldg. Corp., 11 Ill. 2d 431, 143 N.E.2d 40

(1957).
48.
49.

329 U.S. 495 (1947).
Id. at 510-11.

50.

(1965).
111 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 512 (1963).
See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495

51.
52.
supra.
53.
54.
55.

F. JAMES, CIVIL PRocEDuRE 206

(1947), and text accompanying note 9

Note, supra note 24, at 58.
See United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
E.g., City of Chicago v. Harrison-Halsted Bldg. Corp., 11 Ill. 2d 431, 143 N.E.2d
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The broad language used by the Court in Hickman in disposing of the claim
of privilege, however, makes it difficult to sustain the argument that opinions
of an expert such as are contained in an appraisal report are within the
attorney-client privilege. If memoranda prepared by counsel himself are not
privileged, 56 a fortiori reports prepared for him by experts are not. 7 No
reason exists to distinguish expert opinions in the realm of eminent domain
from the general rule that experts' opinions are not privileged in federal
courts. 58

The third line of reasoning used to justify denial of discovery has been
that while facts are subject to discovery, opinionative material is not. 59 This
distinction between fact and opinion is indefensible in most instances involving land condemnation." o Where the testimony of experts is considered
essential, as in condemnation and patent proceedings, 61 expert opinion is
fact for purposes of litigation and constitutes evidence in itself,62 often making up the bulk of the trial material.'13 The distinction between fact and
opinion is therefore irrelevant, and the court should instead inquire whether
it is practicable to require discovery and whether to do so would serve the
4
purposes of the rules of procedure.6
That the material sought is readily available elsewhere is the fourth
reason used to block discovery in eminent domain cases. 65 This rationale is
not persuasive in the type of proceeding involved in the instant case because
the basic facts and appraisers' opinions sought could only be obtained from
the appraisers themselves.6 Discovery of the evaluation of the government's
appraiser is often the only way reliable information as to the value of the
property in question may be obtained by the small landowner who cannot
bear the expense of hiring his own appraiser.
The fifth and most valid justification for denying discovery in land condemnation proceedings is that it may result in unfairness to the party being
moved against67 and provide the moving party a "free ride" at the expense
40 (1957).
56. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
57.
58.

4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §26.24 (1969).
Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948); Maginnis v.

Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. La. 1962).
59. E.g., United States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75, 77-78
(E.D.N.Y. 1962).
60. Note, Discovery of Experts: A Historical Problem and a Proposed FRCP Solution,

53 MINN. L. REV. 785, 796 (1969).
61. See Note, Discovery Provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as Applied
to Patent Infringement Proceedings, 73 DICK. L. REv. 509 (1969).

62.

United States v. 39 Cases, More or Less, 35 F.R.D. 357, 364 (W.D. Pa. 1964); C.

§§13-14 (1954).
63. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 69 (9th Cir. 1968).
64. Id. at 73; State ex rel. Willey v. Whitman, 91 Ariz. 120, 124, 370 P.2d 273, 277
(1962).
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE

65. E.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1959);
United States v. 6.82 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 195 (D.N.M. 1955).
66. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 72 (9th Cir. 1968).

67. E.g., Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940);
cf. Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 188 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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of his opponent's diligence.68 Conversely, a finding of lack of unfairness in
allowing discovery6s9 or a feeling that withholding discovery will result in unfairness to the moving party,7 0 has been explicitly used by judges in granting
motions to discover appraisers' opinions. Making "unfairness" the test of
whether discovery should be allowed in a given case may initially seem a
vague standard. However, because much of the discovery process, especially
regarding the forced production of documents under rule 1.410 of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,71 is discretionary with the trial judge 2 and
public policy is inextricably intertwined in this clash of state and individual
interests73 this rationale may be seen as no more than a recognition of the
many variables that will enter into a decision in this area.
In applying the Shel7 4 decision to the facts in the present case, the court
appeared to adopt this unfairness rationale as the test of whether discovery
was to be allowed against the landowner. Undoubtedly aiding the court in
its determination was a realization of the unique form of a condemnation
suit and the relative roles of the parties in such a suit. Since the right of the
government to take the land is rarely at issue/5 usually the landowner contests only the amount to be paid him as full compensation.8 the landowner,
in effect, is in the position of an innocent party dragged into court without
fault on his part, bearing the burden of proving that the government's
77
evaluation of full compensation is incorrect.
Considering all the factors above, the instant case is seen to be extremely
close. On the one hand are strong arguments for broad discovery in land
condemnation proceedings, with the logical corollary that discovery principles should apply equally to both sides.7 8 On the other hand, the inherent
inequality of position between the state and the private landowner, and
the unique character of condemnation proceedings bring out the equally
strong contention that broad discovery of appraisers' opinions and reports
should not be as readily applied against a landowner as against the government.

79

The facts of a particular case and the identity of the landowner will
often determine whether discovery should be allowed against a private land-

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Note, supra note 19, at 659.
Shell v. State Road Dep't, 135 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1961).
United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963).
This Florida rule corresponds to FED. R. Civ. P. 45.
See Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 180, 192-93, 373

P.24 439, 447 (1962).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Note, supra note 24, at 53.
135 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1961).
See State Road Dep't v. Chicone, 158 So. 2d 753, 756-57 (Fla. 1963).
FLA. CONSr. art. X, §6 (a).
Note, supra note 19, at 673.
Goldstein, supra note 40, at 55-56.
227 So. 2d 703, 706 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
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